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A sample of 58, 6 to 12 year-old children drawn from admissions to a local 
psychiatric hospital were read stories depicting acts of victimization and questioned about 
how both victims and victimizers would be feeling. Participants were randomly assigned 
to either imagine themselves as victimizers in the stories, or victimizers were presented as 
hypothetical characters. Acts of both physical and psychological harm were portrayed in 
which the victimizer either obtained a tangible gain or no gain was received. Children in 
the self-as-victimizer condition attributed fewer positive emotions and gave more moral 
rationales than did children in the hypothetical condition who attributed more positive 
emotions and gave fewer moral rationales. Children also required more probe questioning 
to attribute negative emotions in the hypothetical condition than in the self-as-victimizer 
condition. More positive emotions were attributed to hypothetical victimizers for stories 
of gain versus no gain; however, no distinction between gain versus no gain was found for 
the self-as-victimizer condition. No developmental effect was found for the positive 
emotions attributed in either the self-as-victimizer condition or the hypothetical condition. 
In the self-as-victimizer condition children of all ages attributed primarily negative 
emotions, while in the hypothetical condition children were more likely to attribute 
positive emotions across all age levels. In addition, no developmental effect was found for 
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the rationales attributed. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
A considerable amount of research has looked at how children's cognitive 
processes guide their behavior in social situations. However, the influence of children's 
emotions upon their behavior has been underemphasized (Arsenio & Lover, 1995; Harris, 
1983; Strayer, 1986). Harris (1983) pointed out that the importance of adults' emotional 
states for their judgements in social situations has been recognized. In their review of the 
literature, Arsenio and Lover (1995) noted that recently, many have questioned the 
necessity of separating research on affect and cognition. They argue that affect and 
cognition interact in children's evaluations of social situations. 
Understanding the emotional expectancies children hold is important for those 
studying moral development (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Arsenio & Lover, 1995; Nunner-
Winkler & Sodian, 1988). Children often encounter everyday situations in which they 
must make a choice that has moral implications. For example, a child notices another 
child on a swing that he wants. All of the remaining swings are occupied. He decides to 
push the other child off the swing and take the swing for himself (Arsenio & Kramer, 
1992). How the child expects to feel after pushing the other child off the swing can 
influence his willingness to engage in the act or repeat the act in the future. If the child 
feels happy because he got the swing for himself, he may be more likely to repeat the 
behavior, but if he feels sad or guilty, he may decide against it (Arsenio & 
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Lover, 1995). Piaget was one of the first to emphasize that affect and cognition are 
interrelated (Piaget, 1954/1981). In his theory on moral development, he pointed out the 
importance of children's social experiences. According to Piaget, interactions with peers 
help children to better understand the perspectives of others. He described a series of 
moral development stages through which children progress. In the first stage, children 
between the ages of six and ten years develop a strong respect for the rules of authority 
figures. During this stage children believe in the idea of "immanent justice." This idea 
carries the indication that people can not escape punishment if they violate moral rules. 
However, when children enter the next stage, they begin to realize that social rules are not 
absolute. They begin to understand that rules can be challenged. Piaget believed that this 
stage occurred by the age of ten or eleven years. Piaget emphasized that for the transition 
between the stages to occur, children's cognitive and social abilities must mature. He also 
felt that interactions with peers provided the necessary social experiences to stimulate 
these changes. 
Recent research has brought into question Piaget's idea of "immanent justice." Do 
children expect all violations to be punished even if the acts go undetected? A number of 
studies have shown that children reported feeling happy after acts of undetected 
dishonesty (Barden, Zelko, Duncan, & Masters, 1980; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988); 
this expectation has been called the "happy victimizer effect." If the children expected the 
acts to be punished, a reaction of fear or sadness would be more logical. These results 
suggest that it is important to examine children's expectations regarding the emotional 
consequences of responses to moral dilemmas. 
Kohlberg (1984) expanded on Piaget's theory by describing a sequence of stages 
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that children progress through after ten or eleven years. Kohlberg presented children with 
moral dilemmas to find out how they would reason. One of Kohlberg's best-known 
dilemmas is about a woman who is dying of cancer and needs a special type of drug sold 
only at an expensive price by a druggist. The woman's husband does not have the money 
to pay for the drug, but the druggist refuses to sell it for a cheaper price. The husband 
then must decide whether to steal the drug for his wife. Kohlberg asked children what 
decision the husband should make and why. He was not interested in what they thought 
was the right thing to do, but how they reasoned about the situation. 
Kohlberg did not take emotions into account in his theory. Clearly, the actions of 
the husband could have been motivated by powerful emotions. While Kohlberg's theory 
has been influential in moral development, it is lacking because it overlooks the role 
emotions play. 
Children's Emotional Understanding 
Children use their emotions to guide their behavior in a wide array of situations 
(Arsenio, 1988; Arsenio & Lover, 1995; Harris, 1983). Many of these situations have 
moral implications, while others are just ordinary social events. Harris (1983) was 
interested in finding out how children expect these ordinary events will make them feel. 
He asked six and ten-year-old participants how a story character would feel if his bike 
were scratched or his pet dog were ill. Some of the stories were likely to arouse either a 
neutral reaction, mild sadness, or intense sadness. The participants were then asked how 
the child in the story would feel at various points in the day after the situation occurred 
(i.e., later that morning, that afternoon, that evening, and the following morning). Harris 
found that both the younger and older children expected the emotion to persist after the 
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situation was over. Both age groups anticipated that the emotion would gradually wane 
over time. 
In the second part of the study, participants were read stories about situations that 
would provoke conflicting emotions. For example, one story was about a child opening a 
Christmas gift and then having it snatched away by a younger brother. This type of 
situation could make the child feel happy that he got a gift but angry that his brother took 
it. The majority of children in both age groups denied that two conflicting emotions 
could occur at the same time. They did not think it was possible that the child in the story 
could feel both happy and angry at the same time. 
The third part of the study was a combination of the previous two parts. Children 
were read stories in which a negative situation was followed by a positive situation. 
Participants were asked if a negative emotion aroused from an earlier situation could 
persist and be experienced along with a positive emotion aroused by a later situation. He 
found that participants from both age groups acknowledged that the child in the story 
could be feeling both negative and positive emotions following the two situations. In part 
two, participants denied that a single situation could produce conflicting emotions. 
However, the third part of the study revealed that participants did admit that conflicting 
emotions could be experienced when a negative situation was followed by a positive 
situation. 
Strayer (1986) also looked at how children's emotional conceptions change with 
age. In her study she interviewed four to five-year-olds, seven to eight-year-olds, and 
adults to determine what types of situations they expected would make people feel 
emotions such as happiness or sadness. She predicted that with age, negative emotions 
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such as sadness or anger would increasingly be explained by interpersonal reasons because 
of increased socialization. However, she expected that positive emotions would be 
explained by more impersonal reasons such as material gain. It was also expected that 
achievement reasons would increase with age because of greater demands in school. 
Participants in the study were asked to indicate what would make them feel 
"happy, sad, angry, afraid or surprised." Adults were also asked to judge what would 
make children feel the various emotions, and children were asked to make predictions for 
the adults. The adults were fairly accurate in their predictions for children. However, the 
children were not so accurate; they did not differentiate between their own experiences 
and those of the adults. Overall, the results followed the predictions made. With age, 
there was an increase in interpersonal themes to explain anger and sadness. Happiness and 
surprise were increasingly explained by material and event explanations. As Strayer 
notes, the results suggest that children learn to identify particular emotions with certain 
types of situations. 
The work of Harter and Buddin (1987) and Harter and Whitesell (1989) supports 
a developmental pattern of how children understand emotions. Their research suggests 
that children must progress through a series of stages before they come to the 
understanding that a person can experience two conflicting emotions at the same time. 
Based on the research of Piaget, they reasoned that if children have trouble integrating 
two physical judgments such as height and weight, then it is possible they will have 
problems integrating two emotions, especially if these emotions were oppo sites. 
Interviewing 126 children from the ages of four to twelve years, Harter and 
Buddin (1987) found that as children develop, they progress through a series of five levels 
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of understanding emotion. However, they noted considerable age variability within each 
level. Children seemed to progress through the different levels at an individual pace. Two 
dimensions were used to describe the levels: the valence of each emotion and the target of 
each emotion. At the lowest level, level zero, children completely denied that two 
emotions could occur at the same time. They might say that two emotions such as 
happiness and anger could occur one right after the other, but they firmly believed that the 
two emotions could not coexist. The mean age for this level was 5.2 years. At level one, 
children began to acknowledge that two emotions of the same valence could occur at the 
same time that were directed at the same target. Harter and Whitesell (1989) give the 
example of a boy feeling both happy and glad he got a new puppy. The mean age for this 
level was 7.3 years. 
At level two, children progressed to the understanding that two same-valence 
emotions could be directed toward different targets at the same time. For example, a child 
could feel happy that he got an "A" on his test and glad he could take it home to show his 
parents. However, at this stage children still denied that two emotions of different valence 
could occur at the same time. The mean age for this level was 8.7 years. 
At level three a major advancement occurred. For the first time children 
acknowledged that a person could feel opposite emotions directed at different targets. An 
example which Harter and Whitesell note is that a child could feel both mad at his brother 
for hitting him but happy that his father gave him permission to hit him back. The mean 
age for this level was 10.1 years. 
At level four, the final stage in the sequence, children finally understood that two 
emotions of opposite valence could be experienced at the same time and directed toward 
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the same target. An example would be a child feeling happy that he got a new toy car but 
sad that it was not the model he wanted. The mean age for this stage was 11.3 years. 
The Emotion Event-Link 
Arsenio and Lover (1995) point out that social situations with moral implications 
produce especially powerful emotional consequences for children. They introduced a 
four-step model of how children begin to link emotions to particular types of sociomoral 
events. In step one of their model, children experience and witness different types of 
sociomoral events that cause a variety of emotional reactions. In step two, children begin 
to learn that similar types of events would cause them to feel the same way. For example, 
children might come to expect that when someone took their toys, they would feel angry 
or sad, and when toys were shared, they would feel positive emotions. In step three 
children use the knowledge they gained to anticipate the consequences of their behavior 
and to guide their behavior. In future situations, children might decide to share toys 
instead of taking toys from other children because they could anticipate the emotional 
consequences of these alternatives. Finally, in step four children begin to use the 
knowledge they gained to form general sociomoral principles. The children may have 
formed the principle that taking others' belongings without their permission is wrong or 
that sharing toys is fair. 
Arsenio (1988) explored how children learn to link emotions with different types 
of sociomoral events. Six categories of sociomoral events were used. It was expected 
that children would use their knowledge of how they felt in these types of situations in the 
past to predict how they would feel in the same types of situations in the future. One 
category was inhibitive morality, which involved acts of victimization in which one child is 
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deprived of his rights (e.g., one child pushes another child off his swing and then takes the 
swing for himself). In the active morality category, events were characterized by one 
child intervening to prevent another child from unfairly hurting a third child. The third 
category was conventional morality. Events in this category promoted the smooth 
functioning of social groups. The next category was personal morality. Events in this 
category only affected the child involved, and were usually viewed as outside moral and 
conventional regulations. The fifth category was distributive justice. These events 
involved the distribution of group-earned resources. The last category was prosocial 
morality. These events were ones in which the child used her own private resources to 
help another child. An example would be a child helping another child pick up a game that 
was dropped. 
Arsenio (1988) studied kindergarten, third-grade, and fifth-grade students. 
Participants were read brief stories depicting each of the six different types of sociomoral 
events. They were then asked to assess the emotional consequences of these events for 
both participants and observers. It was expected that children would differentiate between 
the different types of events. This expectation is exactly what was found. Children were 
sensitive to differences in the types of sociomoral events. The emotional consequences 
predicted ranged from very positive for acts of prosocial morality to very negative for acts 
of inhibitive morality. They were also sensitive to the types of roles individuals played 
within these events. Both prosocial morality and distributive justice events were judged as 
having positive consequences for both the actor and the recipient of the action. However, 
for inhibitive morality, it was expected that the actor would feel positively and that the 
recipient and observer would feel negatively. There were no significant age-related 
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changes for how the children viewed the events. 
In part two of Arsenio's (1988) study, participants were given the emotional 
reactions of the characters in the story and were asked to predict the type of sociomoral 
event that caused them to feel that way. It was predicted that children would use their 
knowledge about the different types of events to infer which type of event caused the 
emotional reaction. As age increased, the level of accuracy increased. However, all age 
groups performed at better than chance levels. Clearly, children can use both parts of the 
emotion-event link. They can either start with the situation or the emotion to make 
inferences. Another interesting finding was that children who did poorly on the first task 
also tended to do poorly on the second task. Essentially, children whose affective 
conceptions differed from the norm in the first task were unable to match emotions in the 
second task with the appropriate sociomoral events. As Arsenio (1988) pointed out, this 
finding raises an important question about how children with atypical affective conceptions 
reason about the emotional consequences of sociomoral events. Do children with 
abnormal emotional expectancies foresee their actions as having results different from 
those of children with normal emotional expectancies? 
Children With Abnormal Emotional Conceptions 
Arsenio and Fleiss's (1996) study compared the moral reasoning of behaviorally 
disruptive (BD) and typical children. It was hypothesized that BD children would differ in 
their emotional expectancies because of problems with peer aggression and social limits. 
The following sociomoral events were used: inhibitory, conventional, personal, and 
prosocial morality. It was also expected that differences between the two groups might 
depend on the type of sociomoral event being assessed. 
10 
Seven- and ten-year-old participants were individually interviewed and read stories 
depicting each of the four sociomoral events used. They were asked to give an emotion 
judgment for each character in the story, and to give a reason for their choice. Differences 
were found between the emotion judgments of BD children and normal children for four 
types of sociomoral events. The most pronounced differences were for acts of prosocial 
and inhibitory morality. BD children expected the victims in the inhibitory events to feel 
more sadness and less fear than the normal children did. BD children also explained the 
victimizers' emotions with more references to the material gains the acts produced. For 
acts of prosocial morality, BD children attributed more positive emotions to the 
characters, especially for the recipients of the actions, than did their normal peers. At first 
it would appear that attributing positive emotions would promote prosocial behavior in 
BD children, but the reasons behind their emotion choices are revealing. BD children 
explained the emotion with more references to the fact that the actor had avoided unfairly 
harming or victimizing the recipient and with fewer references to the positive 
consequences for the recipient. Clearly the results of this study indicate that BD children 
have different emotional expectancies than do their peers. These emotional expectancies 
may influence how they behave in sociomoral situations. 
Smetana et al. (1999) compared the emotional reasoning of both maltreated and 
nonmaltreated preschoolers. They examined how children reason about both hypothetical 
scenarios and "actual" events occurring in their everyday lives. Participants were from 
three to five years of age, and the maltreated group was from a center serving low income 
children who had been referred from the Department of Social Services. The maltreated 
children were also classified as to whether they were physically abused or neglected. The 
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nonmaltreated children were from two daycare centers and one kindergarten serving 
mostly low income families. None of the nonmaltreated children had been abused 
according to DSS records and all were from low income families receiving some type of 
public assistance. 
There were two different conditions; in one condition, children were asked about 
hypothetical events and in the other about actual events. In the hypothetical condition, 
participants were presented with brief scenarios of transgressions and then asked questions 
in a fixed order. First, they were asked about how the victimizer would feel, and then they 
were asked about the victim. In the actual events condition, children were interviewed 
about naturally occurring events in their classrooms. The transgressions chosen were 
either aggression, psychological harm, or object disputes. Only transgressions in which a 
response from a teacher or a peer was obtained were used. Interviewers observed until a 
transgression fitting their criteria was obtained. Then they interviewed both the victim and 
victimizer immediately after the transgression occurred, if possible. A child was 
interviewed a maximum of two times for each type of transgression both as a victim and as 
a victimizer, for a maximum of twelve actual event interviews per participant. Not all 
children were interviewed either as a victim or victimizer for all types of moral 
transgressions. Interviewers observed for three sessions until no transgressions meeting 
the criteria were observed among those children participating. 
Smetana et al. (1999) did find a difference between maltreated and nonmaltreated 
children's emotional conceptions regarding victimization. They found that neglected 
children reported less sadness than nonmaltreated children when making judgments about 
how hypothetical characters would feel. Additional differences were found based on 
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gender. Physically abused boys reported less anger when being victimized than did 
nonmaltreated boys across both hypothetical and actual situations. Also, overall, females 
reported that hypothetical victims would feel more sadness in response to psychological 
harm than did males. 
However, no differences were found between maltreated and nonmaltreated 
children's moral evaluations about hypothetical and actual transgressions. Both groups 
judged the transgressions as being wrong and deserving of punishment. Smetana et al. 
(1999) hypothesize that their findings may be due to the fact that affective and moral 
responses are differentially organized or processed by children. 
It is important to note some weaknesses with the Smetana et al. (1999) study. As 
Smetana et al. note, one limitation is that there could have been unreported maltreatment 
in the comparison group since low-income families receiving public assistance are a high 
risk group. Also, the researchers asked the participants about the feelings of the victimizer 
before asking about the feelings of the victim. There could have been an order effect and 
asking about the victimizer first may have influenced the participants to focus more on the 
feelings of the victimizer rather than the victim. In addition, in the actual events condition, 
some participants were interviewed more than others. Being interviewed more frequently 
may have influenced them to respond differently due to "knowing what to expect." Also, 
if the same interviewer was used each time, being interviewed frequently may have given 
the participants a chance to form a "bond" or friendship with the interviewer which could 
have influenced the responses they gave. While the Smetana et al. (1999) has a number of 
limitations, it is important because it extends the research on the happy victimizer effect to 
an abnormal sample that has received little attention in the literature. 
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Further research is needed to explore the interrelation between affect and moral 
evaluations, in both typical and atypical samples. More research also needs to be done 
with a wider age range of children. The sample in the Smetana et al. (1999) study focused 
on a small number of preschool children. It would be interesting to determine whether 
older maltreated children would differ in their affective judgments or if their affective 
responses would become more similar to those of normal children. 
"Happy Victimizer " Expectancies: Developmental and Individual Differences 
The Barden et al. (1980) study was the first to draw attention to the "happy 
victimizer effect." They examined kindergarten, third, and sixth graders' emotional 
reactions to a variety of different social situations. Children were asked if they would feel 
happy, sad, scared, mad, or just ok (neutral) in the different situations described. Of 
particular interest in the happy-victimizer literature are their findings for acts of dishonesty 
in which the character in the story was not caught. They found that most of the younger 
children expected to feel happy, while older children expected to feel scared or fearful. 
A later study by these same authors, Zelko, Duncan, Barden, Garber, and Masters 
(1986), revealed that there was a major discrepancy between how young children expected 
to feel and how adults expected them to feel. Most of the younger children expected to 
feel happy after an act of victimization in which they were not caught, but adults predicted 
that they would primarily feel fear and sadness. Clearly, the adults did not anticipate a 
reaction of happiness. Zelko et al. pointed out that this difference can make relations 
between adults and younger children problematic. If adults inaccurately believe that the 
young children will experience fear in these situations, their attempts to discuss moral 
issues with children and to discipline children may be ineffective. For effective interactions 
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to take place, it is important that adults accurately predict the emotional reactions of 
children. 
Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) were the first to focus exclusively on the 
"happy victimizer effect." They conducted a three-part study to examine the emotions 
four- six-, and eight- year-old children attribute to a story figure who has violated a moral 
rule. In the first part of the study, they attempted to replicate the findings of Barden et al. 
(1980). The following two characters were presented: one who steals a bag of sweets 
from another, and one who resists the temptation to steal. Participants were asked to 
judge how each character would feel and to give justifications for their choices. They 
found that the majority of younger participants (4- to 6-year olds) expected the character 
who committed the theft to feel happy, while eight-year- olds expected a reaction of 
sadness or fear. Younger subjects also gave significantly more outcome-oriented reasons 
for their choices such as "the child got the candy he wanted." Older subjects gave more 
moral reasons such as "it isn't right to steal." 
In the second part of the study, Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) manipulated 
whether the character received a material gain and the salience of the harm done to the 
victim. In one of the stories, the victim was shown crying and bleeding after being pushed 
off a swing by the story character. Despite these manipulations, most younger children 
continued to expect the victimizer to feel happy. In the third part of the study the 
intention of the victimizer was examined. Do young children expect victimizers to feel 
happy only when they intend to do harm to the victim? This expectation was the case. 
In summary, Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) found that younger children 
(four- and six-year olds) expected a victimizer to feel happy and gave outcome 
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justifications for their choices while older children expected a reaction of sadness or fear 
and cited moral reasons for their choices. 
Arsenio and Kramer (1992) did not find the dramatic shift described by Nunner-
Winkler and Sodian (1988). In their two- part study, they found the "happy victimizer 
effect" to be more stable across a wider age range. In part one, participants across three 
age levels (four-, six- and eight-year-olds) were read a story in which a child stole candy 
from another child's locker at school. Participants were asked how both the victim and 
victimizer would feel at the end of the story. They were given a choice of whether to 
assess victims or victimizers first. Arsenio and Kramer (1992) reasoned that if the gain 
received by the victimizer was most prominent, they would judge the victimizer first. 
However, if the loss of the victim was more prominent, they would judge the victim first. 
In addition, participants were asked to give an intensity rating for their judgment. For 
example, participants were asked if the victim felt "a little sad, just sad, or very sad." They 
found that all but one of the four- and six-year-olds and most of the eight-year -olds 
expected the victimizer to feel "happy" or "good." Clearly, these results do not support 
the major attributional shift described by Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988). However, 
eight-year-olds who judged the victims first, expected victimizers to feel less happy than 
did the younger children. Arsenio and Kramer (1992) noted that it could be possible that 
rating the victims first made the eight-year-olds more aware of the negative consequences 
of acts of victimization. This awareness may have moderated the happiness they attributed 
to the victimizers. Arsenio and Kramer were careful to point out that order was not 
experimentally manipulated and few definite conclusions could be drawn. They stated that 
it is just as likely that those who rated victims first were more aware of the costs of 
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victimization before the experiment was conducted. 
Because of these unclear results, Arsenio and Kramer (1992) decided to 
experimentally manipulate the pain or harm done to the victim in part two of their study. 
Two manipulations were made. Victims and victimizers were described as friends, and in 
one story the participant played the role of the victim and a known friend was described as 
the victimizer. Additionally, a series of increasingly direct probe questions were used in 
part two. These probes were used to see if the participant thought the victimizer could be 
feeling anything other than the emotion initially selected. These probes were included to 
address some of the methodological problems of previous studies. In many of the past 
studies, children had to select a single emotion outcome (Arsenio, 1988; Barden et al. 
1980), and in Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988), participants were not questioned any 
further once they made their initial emotion judgment. Also, as Arsenio and Kramer 
(1992) indicated, the probes were included because of the tendency of younger children to 
select positive emotions and deny negative emotions. The probes would give the 
participants a chance to indicate if they thought the victimizer could be feeling both 
positive and negative emotions. Participants also were asked to explain why they chose 
the emotion they did or to give a justification for their choice. 
Almost all of the four- and six-year-olds continued to expect the victimizer to feel 
positive emotions. However, eight- year-olds seemed to be influenced more by the efforts 
to increase the salience of the harm done to the victim. They attributed fewer positive 
emotions to the victimizer. However, slightly more than one half of their judgments were 
positive. The friendship factor did not seem to play an important part. There were no 
differences between the two conditions of victim and victimizers as friends versus 
17 
participants being victimized by a known friend. The rationales or justifications revealed 
that the eight- year-olds gave moral rationales more often than the younger children. 
However, the eight-year-olds still gave outcome- oriented reasons in high numbers (58 
percent for victimizers and 36 percent for victims). 
Arsenio and Kramer (1992) found that almost all of the four-year-olds expected 
the victimizer to feel happy or good even after the increasingly direct probes that drew 
attention to the victim's loss. However, a majority of the six- and eight-year-olds (66 and 
88 percent) responded to the least directive probe by selecting an emotion of opposite 
valence from the one originally selected. Most of the older children originally expected 
the victimizer to feel happy, but when probed further they selected a negative emotion 
such as sadness or anger. 
The results of the probing suggest that, for older children, mixed emotions play a 
significant role. This finding may be due to older children's ability to understand that a 
person can feel conflicting emotions such as happiness and sadness at the same time. 
Younger children may continue to attribute happiness to the victimizer because of 
cognitive limitations that prevent them from understanding that a person can experience 
mixed emotions (Harter & Buddin, 1987; Harter & Whitesell, 1989). The results of 
Arsenio and Kramer (1992) do not support the major attributional shift described by 
Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988). However, their results do support a more subtle shift 
from viewing victimizers as completely happy to an understanding that they may feel both 
happy and sad. 
Lemerise and Scott (1995) looked at the emotional judgements of children with 
different peer statuses for acts of victimization. They conducted peer assessments on a 
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large sample of443 children to identify children's peer acceptance and aggression level. 
Based on the previous research (Arsenio & Fleiss, 1996; Arsenio & Kramer, 1992), they 
expected that both younger children and children who were more aggressive and/or less 
accepted would have different emotional expectancies than the older, more-accepted 
children. 
Participants were individually interviewed and read stories from Arsenio and 
Kramer (1992) that depicted two acts of victimization. The happy-victimizer effect was 
confirmed. The majority of all children expected victimizers to feel happy and victims to 
feel negative emotions such as sadness. However, older children expected victimizers to 
feel less happy than did younger children. Older children were more likely to attribute 
mixed emotions to victimizers, especially when questioned further. Younger children and 
children with higher levels of aggression had more difficulty attributing mixed emotions to 
victimizers. In addition, younger children and aggressive children were more likely to 
explain their choice of happiness for the victimizer with references to the "joy of 
victimization" itself. Clearly, younger children and aggressive children expected the 
victimizer to enjoy the act of victimization. 
Keller, Edelstein, Schuster, Fu-xi, and Hong (1996) studied the happy-victimizer 
effect in a different culture to see whether it would be found in a non-western culture 
where children are socialized differently. Chinese children from Bejing participated; they 
were interviewed individually and read stories depicting moral transgressions. Participants 
were then asked for a description of what happened (to check their understanding) and to 
make an emotion attribution to the victimizer. In addition, they were asked how they 
would feel if they were the victimizer in the story. Finally, they were to indicate how the 
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victim would feel. They predicted that the Chinese subjects' moral development would be 
more advanced than that of the Western subjects used in previous studies. However, they 
still felt that the happy-victimizer effect would be found due to cognitive limitations on the 
part of younger subjects. Based on their findings in the pilot study, it was also expected 
that participants would differentiate between the victimizer described in the story and 
themselves. It was predicted that subjects would attribute more positive feelings to the 
hypothetical victimizers and more negative feelings to themselves as victimizers. 
The findings for the hypothetical victimizer did not support the attributional shift 
described by Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988). Instead, the happy-victimizer finding 
seemed to be more stable across a wider age, range following the pattern of the Arsenio 
and Kramer (1992) study when participants were given scenarios about hypothetical 
characters. They found that 50 percent of all participants (with the exception of the five-
year-olds) attributed negative feelings to the victimizer. No developmental trend was 
found for the hypothetical victimizer condition. 
For the self-as-victimizer condition, a different picture emerged. The majority of 
all participants attributed negative feelings to themselves as victimizers. As age increased, 
the pattern of attributing negative feelings to one's self increased. With age children 
seemed to differentiate between hypothetical victimizers and themselves as victimizers. 
The findings for the self-as-victimizer condition support a developmental shift. Overall, 
the results indicate that the happy victimizer is a universal phenomenon. However, as 
Keller et al. (1996) acknowledge, more cross-cultural studies are needed before any 
definite conclusions can be drawn. 
A later study by Van Zee, Lemerise, Arsenio, Gregory, and Sepcaru (2000) looked 
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at some of the contextual influences upon the happy victimizer effect. A sample of 104 
participants across three different grade levels was used (2nd, 4th, and 6th graders). The 
previous studies described had used stories only about hypothetical characters who do 
physical aggression and receive a material reward as a consequence. In this study 
participants were read stories with both hypothetical characters and stories in which 
participants were asked to imagine themselves as the victimizer (the 2 interviews were 3-4 
weeks apart). The order in which the two types of stories were presented was 
counterbalanced. Acts of both physical and psychological harm were portrayed in which 
the victimizer either received a tangible gain or no gain was received. 
In the study, children did differentiate between themselves as victimizers and 
hypothetical victimizers. Children of all ages attributed more sadness when they were 
pretending to be the victimizer. When the victimizer was a hypothetical character, 
children attributed less sadness and more positive emotions. Unlike the Keller et al. 
(1996) study, no developmental trend was found for the self-as-victimizer condition, while 
for the hypothetical condition, a developmental trend was observed. In the hypothetical 
condition, younger participants attributed fewer negative emotions to victimizers and 
required more probing than older children to attribute negative emotions. However, the 
Van Zee et al. (2000) study looked at older children (8- to 12-year-olds) while the Keller 
et al. (1996) study used younger children (5- to 8- year olds). 
Goals of the Present Study 
Arsenio and Fleiss (1996) found that behaviorally disruptive (BD) children reason 
differently about acts of victimization due to problems with peer aggression and social 
limits. The BD children expected victims to feel less fear than did normal children, and 
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they also made more references to the material gains that the acts produced. However, 
this study used only stories about hypothetical victims and victimizers. The current study 
seeks to extend this research by examining how BD children reason about (a) themselves 
versus hypothetical characters as victimizers, (b) acts of psychological harm versus 
physical harm, and (c) acts associated with material gain versus no material gain. 
The findings of Keller et al. (1996) support the conclusion that children 
differentiate between themselves and others in making emotion attributions. Participants 
in past studies on the happy-victimizer effect (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Barden et al., 
1980; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988) may have judged the hypothetical victimizers in 
the stories to be "bad kids" or "bullies." However, a limitation of the Keller et al. (1996) 
study must be noted. Participants were always asked to rate themselves before rating the 
hypothetical characters. A later study by Van Zee et al. (2000) did counterbalance the 
presentation of the hypothetical and the self as victimizer scenarios. They found that 
children across all age levels attributed primarily negative emotions to themselves as 
victimizers. 
However, both the Keller et al. (1996) and Van Zee et al. (2000) studies 
examined the reasoning of normal populations of children. Little research has examined 
the self vs. hypothetical distinction with a group of behaviorally disruptive children. Since 
BD children engage in more aggressive acts than do normal children they may find such 
acts more acceptable and therefore may attribute fewer negative emotions to themselves 
as victimizers. Arsenio and Fleiss (1996) also found that BD children attributed less 
sadness and fear to victims than did normal children. Because BD children often 
underestimate the negative emotions victims may be feeling, they may not attribute 
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feelings of guilt or sadness to themselves for engaging in such acts. However, it is difficult 
to make a prediction because of the lack of research on the self vs. other distinction with 
abnormal populations. In the present study, the distinction between how behaviorally 
disruptive children reason about themselves and hypothetical characters will be explored. 
Most past studies on the happy-victimizer effect have used stories describing acts 
of instrumental aggression, in which children receive material gains. Arsenio and Lover 
(1995) argued that children may expect victimization to produce happiness because a 
desirable object such as a "candy bar" is obtained. They suggested that the "joy of 
victimization" comes from the material gain received, not from actually doing harm to 
others. However, Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) found that young children (four 
and five-year olds) expected victimizers to feel happy even when their actions produced no 
clear gains. The Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) study used a small number of 
subjects, and it is unclear whether their results are relevant for older subjects because their 
study only included children up to the age of eight years. Arsenio and Kramer (1992) 
found that the happy-victimizer phenomenon is still present among older children. 
Whether the happy-victimizer effect is due to the material gains involved remains 
unclear. Do children expect acts of hostile victimization, in which the victimizer receives 
no clear gain, to produce feelings of happiness? It is predicted that the reasoning of BD 
children will more closely resemble that of younger children who tend to be more 
influenced by the tangible gains involved because of their tendency to think in concrete 
terms. Van Zee et al. (2000) found that for acts of physical harm, younger children 
required more probe questions to attribute negative emotions in cases where a material 
gain was involved. The research of Arsenio & Fleiss (1996) also suggests that BD 
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children may be more influenced by the material gains involved as well. They found that 
BD children explained the victimizer's emotions with more references to the material gains 
that the acts produced. However, the older children who think in abstract terms may 
focus less on the material gains involved (Piaget, 1954/1981). The present study will 
address this question. The distinction between instrumental and hostile victimization will 
be explored. 
The difference between physical and psychological harm has also received little 
attention. Do children view acts of victimization involving physical harm (e.g., punching, 
hitting, kicking) differently from those involving psychological harm (e.g., teasing, name 
calling)? Physical aggression is much more common among younger children and those 
with behavioral disorders. The use of psychological aggression among children increases 
with age (Mash & Wolfe, 1999). Because acts of psychological aggression become more 
common during middle childhood than acts of physical aggression, younger elementary 
students and those with behavioral problems may view psychological harm as not being as 
"bad" as physical harm. Van Zee et al. (2000) found that by sixth grade children were 
more willing to attribute negative emotions to victimizers performing acts of psychological 
harm. This finding was consistent with other data that eleven to twelve year olds have a 
growing appreciation of psychological traits and motivation (Damon & Hart, 1988). It is 
hypothesized that behaviorally disruptive children may view acts of psychological harm as 
being less negative or harmful than acts of physical aggression. However, no specific 
predictions can be made because of the lack of research with abnormal populations. 
Previous research with abnormal populations has used stories depicting acts of physical 
aggression. 
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Overall, it is expected that the happy-victimizer phenomenon will be stable across a 
wide age range of children, following the pattern of Arsenio and Kramer (1992). 
Participants will be asked to make judgments for themselves and hypothetical characters. 
Stories involving instrumental and hostile aggression and physical and psychological harm 
were used to examine potential differences. 
Hypotheses/Predictions 
In summary, the following was hypothesized or predicted for the current study: 
1. The reasoning of children with behavioral disorders will resemble the 
reasoning of younger children who are more influenced by the tangible gains 
involved in many acts of victimization. 
2. Children with behavioral disorders may view acts of psychological harm as 
being less negative or harmful than acts of physical aggression. 
3. It is expected that the happy-victimizer effect will be stable across a wide age 
range of children following the pattern of Arsenio and Kramer (1992). 
Chapter 2 
Method 
Participants 
This study was reviewed and approved by Western Kentucky University's Human 
Subjects Review Board (See Appendix). Participants were drawn from children admitted 
to a local psychiatric hospital. The hospital, a 72 bed facility located in the South Central 
Kentucky region, provides inpatient services to children and adolescents up to the age of 
seventeen. Potential participants were identified through the intake process of the 
admissions department. A folder was created for each new admission which contained 
various documents that the parent or legal guardian reviewed and signed. During the 
intake process, the admissions staff conducts an interview with the guardians, the child, 
and any other relevant parties to obtain background and medical information on each new 
admission. During this process, the parent or legal guardian was asked to give consent for 
their child's participation. Children also gave their assent for participation before the 
interviewer began the procedure (verbal assent for children younger than eight years and 
written assent for children eight years and older). Consent was obtained on approximately 
71 percent of children admitted according to admission records, cords. 
Fifty-eight children participated (39 males, 19 females; 94.8 % Caucasian). The 
age of participants ranged from six to twelve years (M= 10.57, Mdn = 10.96, SD = 1.88). 
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Participants were grouped into three age groups with kindergarten, first and second 
graders in the youngest group (N= 15, M= 8.12 years, SD = 1.14), third, fourth, and fifth 
graders in the second age group (N= 26, M = 10.77 years, SD = 1.11), and sixth and 
seventh graders in the third age group (N= \7, M= 12.42 years, SD = .46). There were 
12 males and 3 females in the youngest group ( males Mage = 7.94, SD = 1.09; females M 
age = 8.82, SD = 1.32), 19 males and 7 females in the second age group (males Mage = 
10.99, SD = .94; females Mage = 10.18, SD = 1.38), and 8 males and 9 females in the 
oldest age group (males Mage = 12.39, SD = .49; females Mage = 12.45, SD = .47). 
These age groups are referred to as "grade level" groups below. 
Participants' Aggression Levels 
The hospital granted access to the information that was relevant to identifying the 
severity of the children's aggressive symptoms. Information on whether the child was 
having suicidal ideations, had a history of suicidal attempts, homicidal ideations, and/or a 
history of homicidal attempts was reviewed. Whether current aggression was reported, 
the frequency of aggressive episodes, and the severity of aggressive symptoms was also 
included in the review. The educational history was another area of importance in helping 
to identify the severity of behavioral problems. Whether the child was reportedly engaging 
in behavioral problems in the school setting and whether they were receiving services as a 
student with an Emotional Behavioral Disability (Kentucky's educational classification 
terminology) was reviewed. The severity of behavior problems at school was coded in the 
following way: 0 = no evidence, 1 = behavior problems noted at school, 2 = behavior 
problems led to detention, 3 = behavior problems led to suspension/expulsion. 
Information on admitting diagnoses was also included. 
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An adapted version of a behavior checklist developed by Dodge, Lochman, 
Harnish, Bates, and Pettit (1997) was used to rate the frequency and severity of children's 
aggressive behaviors. See Table 1 for the specific behaviors listed on this rating form. 
When determining whether the behaviors were present for each participant, raters 
reviewed the information obtained during the intake interview. The behaviors on the 
checklist were coded based on frequency and severity. The frequency of the behaviors 
was coded the following way: 0 = no (behavior not present) or 1 = yes (behavior present) 
while the severity of the behaviors was coded the following way: 0 = no evidence of 
behavior, 1 = mild; 2 = moderate; 3 = severe. 
After reviewing the background information on participants, it was found that 91.4 
percent of the participants had recent aggression reported by parents or guardians. 
Looking at gender, more male participants had reported aggression (38 of 39, 97.4 %) 
than female participants (15 of 19, 78.9 %). For those who had current aggression 
reported, 39.7 percent engaged in aggression daily, 15.5 percent on a weekly basis, 1.7 
percent on a monthly basis, 5.2 percent engaged in aggression rarely and for 37.9 percent, 
information on the frequency of aggression was missing from their intake interview. The 
duration of the aggressive episodes varied with 36.2 percent engaging in episodes greater 
than an hour, 6.9 percent engaged in episodes between 30-60 minutes, and 12.1 percent 
had episodes of 15-30 minutes, 3.4 percent had episodes of less than 15 minute minutes, 
and for 41.4 percent, information on the duration of aggressive episodes was missing. For 
information on the percentage of occurrence of specific types of aggressive behaviors 
listed on the checklist refer to Table 1. Regarding the participants' educational history, 
79.3 percent had reported behavior problems at school with 36.2 percent having severe 
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problems, 10.3 percent having moderate problems, 32.8 percent having mild problems, 
and, for 20.7 percent, information on severity was missing. Of the sample, 20.7 percent 
were receiving special education services as students with Emotional Behavioral 
Disabilities. 
For each participant, a total aggression score was obtained by multiplying the 
frequency by the severity for each specific behavior on the checklist (See Table 1) and 
then taking the sum of these scores. The mean total aggression score for both male and 
female participants was 18.19 with a standard deviation of 8.79. Male participants had a 
mean total aggression score of 20.23 with a standard deviation of 7.62 (grade level 1= M 
= 20.17, SD = 7.08; grade level 2 = M= 19.95, SD = 8.90; grade level 3 = M = 21.00, SD 
= 5.63) while female participants had a mean total aggression score of 14.00 with a 
standard deviation of 9.75 (grade level 1 = M- 14.67, SD = 10.07; grade level 2 =M= 
12.29, SD = 9.69; grade level 3= M 15.11, SD = 8.94). The effects of gender and grade 
level upon the aggression score were examined in a 2 (gender) by 3 (grade level) 
ANOVA. Males had a significantly higher total aggression score than did females, F (1, 
52) = 5.74,/? < .02, but there were no significant effects of grade level group, F (2, 52) = 
.24,p > .05, or significant interactions. 
For homicidal ideation, 29.3 percent of participants had reported homicidal 
ideations, and 8.6 percent had a history of homicidal attempts. As regards suicidal 
ideation, 55.2 reported having had suicidal ideation, and 5.2 percent had a history of 
suicide attempts. Information on the participants' admitting diagnoses was obtained. 
Participants had up to four admitting diagnoses. For the first diagnosis, the most common 
diagnoses were Depressive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (43.1 %), Impulse Control 
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Disorder (24.1 %), and Oppositional Disorder (6.9 %). 
All information obtained concerning participants was kept confidential and was 
used only for the purpose of identifying participants who had problems with aggression. 
Interviewers did not have any prior knowledge about participants. Only children with 
parental consent participated in interviews. 
Materials 
Each moral transgression was depicted in a three-frame sequence of line drawings 
with brief accompanying text. There were two sets of four stories. The set a participant 
received was randomly determined. In each set, two of the stories described acts of 
physical harm; in one of these stories the victimizer obtained a material gain as a result of 
an aggressive act; in the other story there was no material gain. The other two stories 
described psychological harm (e.g., teasing, insults). In one story there was no clear gain 
for the victimizer, while in the other story, the victimizer received a gain as a result of 
psychologically harming the victim. A three-point bar graph scale, with 3 being the most 
intense and 1 one being the least intense, was used to aid participants in making judgments 
about the intensity of the emotions they attributed to victims and victimizers. 
Procedure 
Participants were individually interviewed in one fifteen to twenty-minute session. 
During each interview, participants were read four stories. The order of the four stories 
was randomized. In one condition, the stories were written so that participants were 
asked to imagine themselves in the role of the victimizer, and in the other condition the 
victimizers were presented as hypothetical children. Participants were randomly assigned 
to either the self-as-victimizer condition (imagining themselves as victimizers) or to the 
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hypothetical victimizer condition. 
Participants were first read stories and shown line drawings depicting the stories. 
After each story was read, participants were asked what happened in the story so that their 
understanding could be checked. If participants did not fully understand what happened 
in the story, the interviewer went through the story again until participants had a clear 
understanding. Participants were then asked how the victim would feel at the end of the 
story. After participants made an emotion attribution for the victim, they were then asked 
how the victimizer would be feeling at the end of the story. Next, the participants were 
shown the bar graph scale and asked to rate the intensity of the emotions they attributed to 
both the victim and the victimizer. At this point in the interview, another comprehension 
check was used to make sure participants still had a clear understanding of what happened 
in the story and had not forgotten any parts of the story. Next, participants were asked to 
give a rationale for each emotion choice. For example, if participants stated that the 
victim would feel sad, they were then asked why the victim felt that way; a parallel 
question was asked regarding the victimizer. Finally standard probe questions were asked 
for both the victim and victimizer. Participants were asked if the victim and the victimizer 
could be feeling anything other than the emotions initially attributed. If participants stated 
that the victim and/or victimizer was feeling another emotion, they were then asked to 
give both an intensity judgment and a rationale for the emotion choice as before. 
Scoring 
The emotions children choose for both victims and victimizers were coded with the 
following numbers: 1 = happy, glad, good, etc.; 2 = scared, afraid, anxious, nervous, 
worried; 3 = angry, mad, annoyed, frustrated; 4 = sad, depressed, hurt; 5 = guilty, sorry, 
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regret; 6 = ashamed, embarrassed; 7 = mixed valence emotions (i.e., mixture of positive 
and negative emotions), and 8 = other negative (emotions that do not fit into the 
categories described above). 
The intensity ratings for the emotions the participants choose for both the victim 
and the victimizer were rated on the following seven-point scale: -3 very negative, -2 just 
negative, - l a little negative, 0 neutral, 1 a little positive, 2 just positive and 3 very 
positive. If more than one emotion was attributed to either the victim or victimizer, the 
intensity ratings were combined to arrive at an overall rating. 
Probe questions were used to determine whether the participant felt that the victim 
and/or victimizer could be feeling anything else besides the initially attributed emotion. 
The participants' responses to the probe questions for the victim were coded in the 
following way: 0 = same valence emotion as attributed in the initial questioning or the 
child said that the victim was not feeling any other emotion; 1= opposite valence emotion 
was attributed. The participant's responses to the probe questions for the victimizer were 
coded in the following way: 1 = mixed or negative emotions were attributed to the 
victimizer in the initial questioning; 2 = opposite valence emotions were attributed; 3 = 
same valence emotion as the one initially attributed; and 4 = no response (the child 
indicated that the victimizer was not feeling any other emotion). 
Participants were also asked to give a reason or a rationale for their emotion 
choices for both the victim and the victimizer. The rationales provided for both the victim 
and the victimizer where coded into the following categories: 1.1-1.6 (Moral Reasoning) 
= moral reasoning such as references to the act being unfair, the act is unacceptable 
because the individual knows that he/she would not like it if it were done to him/her, 
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explicit references to the fact that the act would be likely to cause physical or emotional 
harm, the actor realizes that he/she has done something that he/she regrets having done, 
and references to implied victimization; 2.1 (Friendship/Relationship Concerns) = the 
individual expresses concern about the act having been committed towards or by a friend; 
3.1 (Self Focused Negative) = only applies to victimizers, the action caused a self focused 
loss for the victimizer not having to do with material or psychological harm or the act is 
likely to lead to adult sanctions and/or punishments; 5.1-5.4 (Prior Conditions) = act is 
explained as resulting from some previous act, emotion, or relationship that was not 
mentioned in the original story; 6.1 (Outcome Oriented) = the act is a realization of (or 
failure to realize) the victimizer's intention or a loss of an object for the victim; 6.2 (Joy of 
Victimization) happiness at the actual misdeed rather than any concrete gain; and 7.1 
(Story Repetition/Restatement) = repeating of story words without additions. 
Reliability 
The coding of the information obtained on participants' history of aggression was 
completed by one experimenter. To check the reliability, a second experimenter coded 25 
percent of the information coded by the first experimenter. Cohen's Kappa was used to 
calculate the obtained reliability. The mean Kappa obtained on all items of information 
coded was K = .91. 
The rationales given by participants were coded by one experimenter. The 
experimenter then took 25 percent of the rationales and re-coded them to check reliability. 
Cohen's Kappa was used to calculate the obtained reliability. For the victim rationales, 
the reliability was K = .97 and for the victimizer rationales the reliability was K = .97. All 
other information coded from the interviews was double-checked for accuracy by the 
33 
experimenter. 
Chapter 3 
Results 
Overview 
Elementary-age participants at an inpatient psychiatric hospital were asked how 
they expected both victims and victimizers to feel about acts of physical and psychological 
harm in which victimizers either received a gain or did not receive an apparent gain for 
their actions. Participants also were asked to give an intensity rating for the discrete 
emotions chosen for both the victim and victimizer. The emotions were rated on a seven 
point scale with a negative three being the most intensely negative and with a positive 
three being the most intensely positive. In addition, participants were asked to give a 
rationale for their emotion choice for both the victim and victimizer. Rationales were 
coded into the following categories: moral reasoning, friendship concerns, negative 
outcome for the victimizer, prior conditions, outcome reasons, and joy of victimization. 
Finally, probe questions were used to find out whether participants felt that the victim and 
victimizer could be feeling another emotion than the one initially selected. In addition, 
Pearson correlations were obtained to determine if any of the above mentioned variables 
correlated significantly with the total aggression score for participants. A significant 
correlation of r (58) = .260, p < .05, was found between the quantitative emotion ratings 
given for victims in stories in which the victimizer received a gain and the total aggression 
score for participants. No other significant correlations (r's (58) < .221, p >.05) were 
found between any of the variables and the total aggression score for participants. 
A series of chi-square tests of independence were performed to test the effects of 
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age, gender, and three experimental conditions (self versus hypothetical victimizer, 
physical harm versus psychological harm, and gain versus no gain) on the discrete 
emotions and rationales attributed to victims and victimizers since these variables were 
categorical. 
Mixed design ANOVAs with between-subject factors of age, gender, and self 
versus hypothetical victimizer conditions, and within-subject factors of physical harm 
versus psychological harm and gain versus no gain were used on the intensity ratings and 
the responses to probe questions. Tukey's HSD tests were used to test significant 
interactions that involved either within subject factors only or between subject factors 
only. Repeated measures t tests, and independent t tests were used to test significant 
interactions that involved both within- and between-subject factors. 
Discrete Emotions Analyses 
Attributions for victims. Children primarily expected the victim to feel either sad 
or angry in both the self-as-victimizer condition and the hypothetical victimizer condition, 
and there were no significant differences between the attributions made about victims in 
these conditions. For the self condition, the following percentages of emotions were 
attributed to the victim: 58.93 sad or angry in both the self-as-victimizer condition and 
the hypothetical victimizer condition, and there were no significant differences between 
the attributions made about victims in these conditions. For the self condition, the 
following percentages of emotions were attributed to the victim: 58.93 for sadness, 36.61 
for anger, 3.57 for mixed negative, and .90 for scared. For the hypothetical condition, the 
following percentages of emotions were attributed to the victim: 61.61 for sadness, 25.83 
for anger, 11. 67 for mixed negative and .83 for scared (see Table 2). In summary, 100 
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percent of the emotions attributed to victims in both the self and hypothetical conditions 
were negative in valence. Chi-square analyses on discrete emotion attributions to victims 
failed to reveal any significant effects of condition (self versus hypothetical victimizer) or 
for type of story (gain versus no gain). Also, within each condition (self versus 
hypothetical victimizer) there were no significant effects of grade, but across conditions 
there was a significant effect of grade, %2 (16, N = 227) = 23.37,/? < .01. Sixth and 
seventh grade children attributed more anger to victims than expected, z = -2.42, p < .05. 
Sixth and seventh grade children also attributed less sadness than expected to victims, z = 
3.93, p < .001. Third, fourth, and fifth graders attributed more mixed negative emotions 
to victims than expected, z = -9.46,/? < .001. 
Self-as-Victimizer Versus Hypothetical Victimizer. There was a significant 
difference between the discrete emotions attributed by children to victimizers in the self-
as-victimizer condition and children in the hypothetical victimizer condition, % (8, N = 
231) = 57.06, p < .01. Children attributed fewer happy emotions than expected to 
themselves as victimizers, z = 7.85, p < .001. Children attributed more happy emotions 
than expected when the victimizer was a hypothetical character, z = -4.15,/? < .001. 
Children also attributed more sadness than expected to themselves as victimizers, z = 
4.00, p < .001. Children in the hypothetical victimizer condition, attributed less sadness 
than expected, z = 4.58,/? < .001 (see Table 2). In summary, children who imagined 
themselves as victimizers attributed fewer happy emotions and more sad emotions than 
expected. However, when children reasoned about a hypothetical victimizer, they 
attributed more happy and fewer sad emotions than expected. 
There was a significant effect of grade level for the emotions children attributed to 
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themselves when pretending to be the victimizer (self condition), %2 (16, N = l 12) = 39.78, 
p < .01. Kindergartners, and 1st, and 2nd graders attributed sadness to themselves as 
victimizers more often than expected, z = -2.10, p < .05. Sixth and seventh graders 
attributed guilt to themselves as victimizers more often than expected, z = 2.93, p < .01 
(see Table 3). In summary, kindergarteners, and 1st, and 2nd graders attributed more 
sadness to themselves as victimizers while 6th and 7th graders attributed more guilt to 
themselves as victimizers. 
Chi-square tests also revealed a significant effect of grade for discrete emotions 
attributed to hypothetical victimizers, (16, N = 118) = 23.70,/? < .05. Kindergartners, 
and 1st and 2nd graders attributed less anger to hypothetical victimizers than expected, z = 
4.14,/? < .001. No other significant differences were noted. Sixth, and seventh graders 
did attribute fewer happy emotions than did younger participants, however, the difference 
was not statistically significant (see Table 3). 
There was a significant effect of gain versus no gain for discrete emotions 
attributed to hypothetical victimizers, %2 (8, N = 118) = 18.81, p < .05. For stories in 
which the hypothetical victimizer received a gain, children attributed more positive 
emotions than expected, z = 3.15, p < .01. For stories in which the hypothetical victimizer 
did not receive a gain, children attributed fewer positive emotions than expected, z = 3.37, 
p < .001. Participants also attributed less anger than expected for stories in which a gain 
was received, z = 2.21, /? < .05 (see Table 4). In summary, participants attributed more 
positive emotions when the hypothetical victimizer received a gain and fewer positive 
emotions than expected when no gain was received. Also, children attributed less anger 
than expected when the hypothetical victimizer received a gain. 
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Intensity of Emotions Attributed to Victims and Victimizers 
A mixed design ANOVA examined the within-subjects effects of role (whether the 
child was making attributions for the victim or victimizer), type of story (whether the harm 
done was physical or psychological), and gain (whether a gain was received or not) on the 
intensity of the emotions attributed. Gender, grade level, and condition (whether the child 
was making attributions for self as victimizer or for a hypothetical victimizer) were 
between-subject factors. A main effect of role, F (1, 46), = 56. 19, p < .001 was modified 
by a significant interaction between role (whether the child was making attributions for the 
victim or victimizer) and condition (self-as-victimizer versus hypothetical victimizer), F ( 1, 
46) = 15.70, p < .001. Repeated measures t tests were used to examine mean differences 
between the intensity of emotions attributed to the victim and victimizer in both the self 
and hypothetical conditions since role was a within- subjects variable within each of these 
conditions. Independent t tests were used to test the effects of condition for judgments for 
victims and victimizers since condition was a between-subjects factor. Significance level 
for these tests was set at p < .0125 to avoid inflating alpha with multiple tests. There were 
significant effects ofrole in the self-as-victimizer condition t (27) = 6.13,/? < .01 and in 
the hypothetical condition t (29) = 8.52,/? < .001 (See Table 5). In both conditions, 
participants rated the victim's emotions as more intensely negative than those of the 
victimizer. There was no significant effect of condition (self-as-victimizer versus 
hypothetical victimizer) on judgments of emotion intensity for victims, t (56) = -.076,/? > 
.40, but a significant difference was found for judgements about victimizers, t (56) = -
5.35,/? < .001. Children in the hypothetical condition judged victimizers as feeling 
significantly less negatively than did children in the self-as-victimizer condition. 
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A main effect of gain, F (1, 46) = 4.27, p < .05 was modified by a significant 
interaction between role and gain (whether the victimizer received a gain or not), F (1, 46) 
= 5.02,p< .04. A Tukey's HSD analysis was used to examine this interaction. Children 
rated victims' emotions as more intensely negative than those of the victimizer in both the 
gain and no gain conditions (both at p < .01). There was no significant difference in the 
intensity ratings for the victims' emotions in the gain and no gain conditions. However, a 
difference between the intensity ratings of the emotions attributed to the victimizer in the 
gain and no gain conditions was found with children attributing more intensely negative 
emotions in the no gain condition (p < .01) (See Table 6). 
In summary, children always rated the victims' emotions as more intensely 
negative than those of the victimizer. Victimizers' emotions were rated as more intensely 
negative when the victimizer did not receive a gain than when he/she did. Also, children in 
the hypothetical victimizer condition rated victimizers' emotions as less intensely negative 
than did the children in the self-as-victimizer condition. 
Rationale Analyses 
Participants were asked to give rationales for each emotion choice. For example, 
if participants stated that the victim would feel sad, they were then asked why the victim 
felt that way. The same procedure was used for the victimizer. The rationales given were 
coded into the following categories: moral reasoning, friendship concerns, negative 
outcome for the victimizer, prior conditions, outcome reasons, and joy of victimization. 
Self-as-Victimizer Versus Hypothetical Victimizer. There was no significant effect 
of victimizer condition for the rationales given for victims' emotions, % (6, N=232) = 
5.94, p > .05, but there was a significant difference between the rationales children 
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provided for themselves as victimizers and the rationales they provided for hypothetical 
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victimizers, % = (6, N = 242) = 49.36, p < .01. Children attributed more moral rationales 
than expected for themselves as victimizers, z = -5.81, p < .001 and fewer moral rationales 
than expected for hypothetical victimizers, z = 4.71, p < .001. Children responded with 
more references to friendship concerns than expected in the hypothetical victimizer 
condition, z = 7.98,/? < .001. Also, children attributed fewer outcome rationales for 
themselves as victimizers than expected, z = 4.49,/? < .001, and more outcome rationales 
for hypothetical victimizers than expected, %2 = 3.02,/? < .01. For the self-as-victimizer 
condition, children gave fewer joy of victimization rationales than expected, z = 3.56,/? < 
.001 (See Table 7). Overall, for the self-as-victimizer condition children responded with 
more moral responses, less outcome-related responses, and less references to the joy of 
victimization than expected. For the hypothetical victimizer condition, children provided 
fewer moral responses, and more outcome- related rationales than expected. 
Victims and Victimizers in Gain/No Gain Conditions. There was a significant 
difference between the emotion rationales children gave for the victim in the stories in 
which they imagined themselves as victimizers who received gains and in the stories where 
they imagined themselves as victimizers who did not receive gains, %2 ( 6 , 1 1 2 ) = 
16.95, p = .05. Children attributed fewer moral rationales to themselves as victimizers 
than expected when a gain was received, z = 2.33, p < .05, and more moral responses 
when no gain was received, z = -8.03, p = .001. For stories in which a gain was received 
in the self-as-victimizer condition, children responded with more outcome rationales for 
the victim than expected, z = -2.33,/? < .05 and for stories with no gain children 
responded with fewer outcome rationales than expected, z = 8.07, p < .001 (see Table 8). 
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In summary, for the self-as-victimizer condition, children attributed more moral responses 
to the victim when no gain was involved for the victimizer and fewer moral rationales 
when a gain was received by the victimizer. Children also attributed more outcome 
responses for the victim than expected when a gain was received by the victimizer and 
fewer outcome responses than expected when no gain was received by the victimizer. 
For the hypothetical victimizer condition, there was a significant difference 
between the emotion rationales children gave for victimizers in stories in which the 
hypothetical victimizer received a gain and for stories in which the hypothetical victimizer 
did not receive a gain, %2 (6, N = 129) = 21.74 ,p< .01, but the parallel analysis of 
victimizer emotion rationales in the self-as-victimizer condition did not reach significance, 
X2 (6, N= 113) = 11.54, p > .05. Children reported fewer references to prior conditions 
to explain victimizers' emotions when a gain was received than expected, z = 2.38, p < 
.05. Also, for stories in which the hypothetical victimizer received a gain, more outcome 
rationales were given by participants for victimizers' emotions, z = -3.20, p < .01 than 
expected; for stories with no gain, they gave fewer outcome responses than expected, z = 
3.43, p < .001. For stories in which the hypothetical victimizer received no gain, children 
also gave more rationales for victimizers' emotions relating to the joy of victimization, z 
=15.58,p < .001 (See Table 8). 
Physical versus Psychological Harm Stories. For the rationales given for victims' 
emotions, there were no story type (physical versus psychological) effects in the self-as-
victimizer condition, %2 (6, N=112) = 0, p > .05, the hypothetical condition, y2 (6, N = 
120) = 4.16,p > .05, or across conditions, N= 235) = 3.59, p > .05. 
There was a significant difference between the rationales given for hypothetical 
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victimizers' emotions in physical harm stories versus psychological harm stories, % (6, N 
= 141) = 14.46, p < .05, but z-tests failed to reveal any significant differences. For the 
self-as-victimizer condition, no significant differences were noted between the rationales 
given in the physical harm stories versus the psychological harm stories, %2 = (6, N= 113) 
= 2.89, ^ > . 0 5 . 
Developmental Analyses. No significant differences between grade levels were 
noted for the rationales children attributed to victimizers in both the self and hypothetical 
conditions, y2 (10, N =113 or 119) < 15, p > .05. Children primarily responded with 
either moral or outcome rationales across grade levels, and conditions (see Table 9). As 
noted, earlier children in the self-as-victimizer condition responded with more moral 
responses than outcome responses. However, their responses did not vary across grade 
levels. In the self-as-victimizer condition, children consistently gave more moral responses 
for themselves as victimizers across grades. Thus, no developmental differences in 
emotional rationales for victimizers were found for either the self-as-victimizer or the 
hypothetical victimizer conditions. 
There were no significant effects of grade level for the rationales children 
attributed for stories in which the victimizer received a gain in the self-as-victimizer 
condition, %2 (10, N= 53) = 5.81, p > .05, or in the hypothetical victimizer condition, % 
(10, N=59) = 4.59,/? > .05. No significant effect of grade level was found for no gain 
stories in either the self-as-victimizer condition, % (10, TV =61) = 9.30, p > .05 or the 
hypothetical victimizer condition, %2 (10, N=60) = 13.14,/? > .05. 
For stories in which physical harm was done, no significant effect of grade was 
found in the self-as-victimizer condition, %2 (10, N=56) = 12.70, p > .05, or the 
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hypothetical victimizer condition, (10, N =60) = 7.52, p > .05. Also, no significant 
effect of grade was found for stories in which psychological harm was done, for either the 
self-as-victimizer, (10, N= 53) = 1.63, p > .05, or the hypothetical victimizer, %2 (10, N 
=60) = 4. II, p >.05. 
In summary, no developmental effects for emotion rationales were found by type 
of story (gain versus no gain) or by the type of harm done (physical versus psychological). 
No developmental effects were found in either the self-as-victimizer condition or the 
hypothetical victimizer condition. 
Probe Results 
Children were asked whether the victim would feel anything other than the initially 
attributed emotion (probe question). Their answers were coded to reflect whether 
opposite valence emotions were attributed (1) or not (0). Across stories and conditions 
the mean for this variable was .03, indicating that children rarely attributed opposite 
valence emotions to victims after being probed. 
Children also were asked whether the victimizer could be feeling anything other 
than the initially attributed emotion. Their answers were coded as follows: 1 = mixed or 
negative emotions attributed in initial question, 2 = opposite valence emotions attributed 
after probe question, 3 = same valence emotions attributed at probe question, 4 = said 
victimizers would not feel any other emotion than the one initially attributed. Thus, higher 
scores indicate children had difficulty understanding that victimizers might feel a negative 
emotion in situations of victimization. 
A repeated measures ANOVA with within-subject factors of type of harm 
(physical versus psychological) and type of story (gain versus no gain) and between-
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subject factors of gender, grade level, and condition (self victimizer versus hypothetical 
victimizer) was performed on probe results for victimizers. A main effect of condition, F 
(2, 46) = 3.78,/? < .04 was found with children requiring more probing to attribute 
negative emotions to a hypothetical victimizer (M= 2.36, SD = 1.07) than to themselves as 
the victimizer (M= 1.88, SD = 1.05). No significant interactions were found. 
In summary, children rarely attributed opposite valence emotions to victims after 
being probed indicating that the probe methodology did not "force" children to change the 
emotions attributed. For the victimizer, children required more probing in the hypothetical 
victimizer condition than in the self-as-victimizer condition to attribute another emotion 
than the one initially selected. 
Chapter 4 
Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to extend research on the "happy victimizer 
effect" to a sample of children with behavioral disorders. One goal was to examine how 
children reason about themselves versus hypothetical characters as victimizers. Little 
research has examined the self versus hypothetical victimizer distinction with a group of 
children with behavioral disorders. Since children with behavioral disorders engage in 
more aggressive acts than do other children it was hypothesized that they may find such 
acts more acceptable and therefore may attribute fewer negative emotions in both self-as-
victimizer and hypothetical victimizer conditions. However, it was difficult to make a 
prediction because of the lack of research on the self versus other distinction with 
populations that differ from the norm. 
In the present study, children did differentiate between themselves as victimizers 
and hypothetical victimizers. For themselves as victimizers, children attributed fewer 
positive emotions and more sadness than expected by random association. As in previous 
studies, children attributed more positive emotions to a hypothetical victimizer than to 
themselves as victimizers (Keller et al., 1996; Van Zee et al., 2000). Previous research by 
Van Zee et al. (2000) examined this distinction with a group of elementary students and 
found that children across all age levels attributed primarily negative emotions to 
themselves as victimizers. For the hypothetical victimizer in the Van Zee et al. (2000) 
study, children attributed fewer negative emotions and more positive emotions, and a 
developmental trend was observed in the hypothetical condition with older children (sixth 
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emotions to themselves as victimizers. For the hypothetical victimizer in the Van Zee et 
al. (2000) study, children attributed fewer negative emotions and more positive emotions, 
and a developmental trend was observed in the hypothetical condition with older children 
(sixth graders) attributing fewer positive emotions than expected. The findings of the 
current study and the Van Zee et al. study support the hypothesis that children may judge 
the hypothetical victimizers in the stories as just "bad kids" or "bullies." When younger 
children were imagining themselves as the victimizers, Van Zee et al. found they were 
more likely to attribute negative emotions in the initial questioning and required less 
probing to attribute negative emotions to the victimizer. Thus, even the younger children 
in the Van Zee et al. study differentiated between themselves as victimizers and 
hypothetical victimizers. 
In the present study, a developmental effect was found for the self-as-victimizer 
condition with first and second graders attributing more sadness than expected and sixth 
and seventh graders attributing more guilt than expected. For the hypothetical victimizer, 
children attributed more positive emotions and less sadness than expected. A 
developmental effect was found with first and second graders attributing less anger than 
expected to hypothetical victimizers. Older children did attribute fewer positive emotions 
than did younger children to the hypothetical victimizer, however this difference was not 
statistically significant; thirty-six percent of sixth and seventh graders still attributed 
positive emotions. In earlier research (Van Zee et al., 2000) it was found that older 
children (6th graders) attributed significantly fewer positive emotions to hypothetical 
victimizers than did younger children. Additionally, older children in the Van Zee et al. 
study were much more responsive to probe questioning than were the children in the 
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present study, indicating that they understood that victimizers may experience mixed 
emotions. Because the current sample had a significant history of aggression, they may 
have underestimated the negative feelings of the hypothetical victimizer or failed to 
recognize that a hypothetical victimizer may experience mixed emotions, simply labeling 
the hypothetical character as a "bad kid" who enjoys engaging in such acts. 
There was also a difference in the intensity of emotions children attributed to 
themselves as victimizers versus to hypothetical victimizers. Children attributed more 
intensely negative emotions to themselves as victimizers than to hypothetical victimizers. 
Also, children attributed much more intensely negative emotions to victims than to 
victimizers. This finding supports the research of Van Zee et al. (2000) who also found 
that more intense emotions were attributed to victims than victimizers, and, similarly, 
more intense emotions were attributed to the self-as-victimizer than to hypothetical 
victimizers. 
Participants also were asked to give rationales for each emotion choice for both 
the victim and victimizer. The rationales were coded into the following categories: moral 
reasoning, friendship concerns, negative outcome for the self, prior conditions, outcome 
reasons, and joy of victimization. There was a significant difference between the 
rationales children gave for themselves as victimizers versus hypothetical victimizers. 
Children made more moral reasoning rationales for themselves as victimizers and fewer 
than expected for hypothetical victimizers. Children also responded with fewer outcome 
rationales for themselves as victimizers and more outcome rationales than expected for 
hypothetical victimizers. For themselves as victimizers, children also responded with 
fewer references to joy of victimization than expected. Overall, for the self-as-victimizer 
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condition, children responded with more moral responses, fewer outcome responses, and 
fewer references to joy of victimization than expected. For the hypothetical victimizer, 
children provided fewer moral responses, and more outcome-related rationales than 
expected. These findings for the rationales attributed to victimizers add support to the 
finding that children reason differently about themselves as victimizers versus hypothetical 
victimizers. 
There was no developmental effect for the emotion rationales children gave in 
either the self-as-victimizer or for the hypothetical victimizer conditions. Children 
responded with primarily moral or outcome rationales across grade levels. In the self-as-
victimizer condition, children responded with more moral rationales, and in the 
hypothetical condition they tended to give more outcome rationales. However, their 
responses did not vary across grade levels. 
In the current study, it was examined whether children with behavioral disorders 
would be more willing to attribute positive emotions when a tangible gain was received by 
the victimizer than when no gain was received. It was predicted that the reasoning of 
children with behavior disorders may more closely resemble the reasoning of younger 
children who tend to be more influenced by the tangible gains involved. Arsenio and 
Fleiss (1996) also found in their research that children with behavioral disorders explained 
the victimizer's emotions with more references to the material gains that the acts 
produced. The distinction between instrumental and hostile victimization also was 
explored with children with behavioral disorders in the current study. 
In the current study, a difference was found for hypothetical victimizers in the 
emotions attributed for stories in which a gain was received versus stories in which no 
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gain was received. Children attributed more positive emotions than expected to the 
hypothetical victimizer when a gain was received and fewer positive emotions when no 
gain was received. Additionally, children attributed less anger to the hypothetical 
victimizer when a gain was received. For the self-as-victimizer condition, no distinction 
between gain versus no gain was found. Children in the self-as-victimizer condition 
primarily expected to feel negative emotions whether a gain was received or not. For 
hypothetical victimizers, children attributed more positive emotions for stories in which a 
gain was received and fewer positive emotions than expected when no gain was received. 
The current research supports the hypothesis that children with behavior disorders may be 
more influenced by the tangible gains involved in acts of victimization resembling the 
reasoning of younger children when reasoning about hypothetical characters. 
In previous research Van Zee et al. 2000 found that younger children required 
more probing to attribute negative emotions to the victimizer for stories in which a gain 
was received than for stories in which no gain was received. The current findings and the 
research of Van Zee et al. (2000) raise the possibility that younger children and children 
with behavioral disorders may be more influenced by the tangible gain involved in many 
acts of victimization. Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) and Arsenio and Kramer (1992) 
also found that younger children gave more outcome-oriented rationales for their happy 
victimizer attributions. 
In addition, for stories in which a gain was received, children rated victimizers' 
emotions as less intensely negative than they did for stories in which no gain was received. 
In the Van Zee et al. (2000) study, no difference in intensity of negative emotions 
attributed to victimizers in gain versus no gain condition was found. Clearly, the 
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participants in the current study appear to be influenced by the tangible gains involved in 
acts of victimization. The current sample of participants have a significant history of past 
aggression and may have had more personal experience in receiving gains from acts of 
victimization. 
There was also a difference in the rationales attributed in stories in which a gain 
was received versus stories in which no gain was received in the self-as-victimizer 
condition. When providing rationales for the emotions chosen for victims, children gave 
fewer moral responses when a gain was received and more moral responses than expected 
when no gain was received. Children also provided more outcome rationales for the 
victim when a gain was obtained by the victimizer in the self-as-victimizer condition and 
fewer outcome rationales than expected when there was no gain. Outcome rationales for 
victims usually referred to the victim's loss (which was the victimizer's gain). 
For the hypothetical victimizer, a difference in the rationales given for stories of 
gain versus no gain was also found. However, for the self-as-victimizer condition, there 
was no significant effect of gain versus no gain for the emotion rationales children gave for 
victimizers. In the hypothetical condition, children made fewer references to prior 
conditions than expected when a gain was received. Children also gave more outcome 
rationales when a gain was received and fewer outcome rationales when no gain was 
received for the hypothetical victimizers. In addition, children provided more references 
to the joy of victimization when no gain was received. 
In summary, children appeared to be influenced by the tangible gains involved. 
Even in the self-as-victimizer condition, children gave fewer moral rationales for the victim 
for stories in which a gain was received and more moral rationales for the victim when no 
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gain was received. Children also gave more outcome-related responses than expected for 
the hypothetical victimizer when a gain was received. This finding supports the research 
of Arsenio and Fleiss (1996) who found that children with behavioral disorders explained 
the victimizer's emotions with more references to the material gains that the acts 
produced. 
The difference between physical and psychological victimization has received little 
attention in the happy victimizer literature. Physical aggression is much more common 
among younger children and those with behavioral disorders. The use of psychological 
aggression among children increases with age (Mash & Wolfe, 1999). It was hypothesized 
that the reasoning of children with behavior disorders may be more similar to that of 
younger children. However, no specific predictions were made because of a lack of 
research with populations that differ from the norm. Previous research with populations 
that differ has used stories depicting acts of physical aggression. 
However, children in the current study did not appear to distinguish between 
physical and psychological harm in contrast to the Van Zee et al. (2000) finding that 
younger children (second and fourth graders) required more probing to attribute negative 
emotions when the victimizer did psychological harm and received a gain while by sixth 
grade children were more willing to attribute negative emotions to victimizers performing 
acts of psychological harm. In the current study, no developmental trend was found for 
the emotions attributed or rationales given in psychological harm and physical harm, 
suggesting that the current sample may not clearly differentiate between the two different 
forms of aggression. 
Children also were asked if the victim and victimizer could be feeling any other 
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emotions than the ones initially chosen. Children rarely attributed opposite valence 
emotions to victims after being probed. Children required more probe questions to 
attribute negative emotions to hypothetical victimizers than for themselves as victimizers. 
For themselves as victimizers, children were more likely to attribute negative emotions in 
the initial questioning and required fewer probe questions to attribute negative emotions to 
victimizers which is consistent with previous findings (Van Zee et al., 2000). 
The findings of the present study add additional support to the findings of previous 
research on the "happy victimizer effect." As in previous research, the current sample of 
children viewed hypothetical victimizers differently from themselves (Keller et al., 1996; 
Van Zee et al., 2000). The majority of children across age levels expected to feel 
negatively when imagining themselves as victimizers. However, for the hypothetical 
victimizer, children attributed more positive emotions and less sadness than expected 
supporting the hypothesis that children may view hypothetical characters as "bullies" or 
"bad kids." Children in the current study also appeared to be influenced by the tangible 
gains involved, attributing less intensely negative emotions in gain versus no gain 
conditions and attributing fewer moral responses to hypothetical victimizers when a gain 
was involved. 
It should be noted that the current study had certain limitations. One limitation 
was that the study used a relatively small number of participants from one geographic 
region. Research on a larger, more diverse sample is needed before the results of the 
current study can be generalized. Another limitation is that participants were drawn from 
one inpatient psychiatric facility. More research is needed at additional psychiatric 
facilities to determine if the current sample is typical of children with behavior disorders. 
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A possible idea for future research may be to compare an inpatient and an 
outpatient population of children with behavior disorders to explore whether their views 
on victimization would differ in the type or intensity of judgments made. Another idea 
would be to extend the research of Smetana et al. (1999) who compared the emotional 
reasoning of both maltreated and non-maltreated pre-schoolers. Since maltreated children 
from low income families are a high risk group for developing difficulties with aggression, 
the distinction between maltreated and non-maltreated children is in need of further study 
with a wider age range. Overall, more research is needed to explore the interrelation 
between affect and moral evaluations, in both typical and atypical samples. 
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Table 1 
Percent of Children Engaging in Aggressive Behaviors by Frequency and Severity As 
Reported During Intake Interview 
Severity Percent 
Behaviors % of Children w/Behavior Mild Moderate Severe 
Arguing, Quarreling 77.6 24.1 53.4 0.0 
Cursing Swearing 60.3 60.3 0.0 0.0 
Easily Angered, Irritable 79.3 10.3 69.0 0.0 
Property Destruction 
During An Argument 
51.7 51.7 0.0 0.0 
Physical Attacks out 
Of Anger 
81.0 0.0 19.0 62.1 
Talks Back, Impertinent 82.8 82.8 0.0 0.0 
Temper Tantrums 65.5 0.0 65.5 0.0 
Animal Cruelty 24.1 0.0 0.0 24.1 
Bullying, Teasing 67.2 8.6 58.6 0.0 
Disruptive, Bothersome 
Behaviors 
84.5 79.3 5.2 0.0 
Threatening Others 70.7 1.7 55.2 13.8 
Vandalism 56.9 56.9 0.0 0.0 
Other3 37.9 1.7 0.0 34.5 
includes fire-setting and use of weapons. 
66 
Table 2 
Percent of Children Attributing Discrete Emotions to Victims and Victimizers in Self and 
Hypothetical Conditions 
Victims Victimizers 
Emotions Self Hypothetical Self Hypothetical 
Happy 0.00 0.00 8.00* 47.10* 
Scared 0.90 0.83 0.00 0.00 
Angry 36.61 25.83 20.50 18.50 
Sad 58.93 61.67 58.90* 22.70* 
Guilty 0.00 0.00 10.70 7.60 
Mixed 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 
Other Negative 0.00 0.00 1.80 0.80 
Mixed Negative 3.57 11.67 00.00 0.80 
Note. Significant as compared to the total expected percentage. 
*p<M\. 
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Table 3 
Percent of Children Attributing Discrete Emotions to Victimizers in Self and 
Hypothetical Conditions by Grade 
Self 
Condition 
Hypothetical 
Emotions K-2nd 3rd_5th 6th-7th K-2nd 3rd_5th 6th-7th 
Happy 3.10 14.60 3.10 55.60 50.90 36.10 
Angry 12.50 31.30 12.50 3.70*** 20.00 27.80 
Sad 75.00* 54.20 50.00 37.00 14.50 25.00 
Guilty 3.10 0.00 34.40** 0.00 12.70 5.60 
Mixed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.60 
Other Neg. 6.30 0.00 0.00 3.70 0.00 0.00 
Mixed Neg. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.80 0.00 
Note. Significant as compared to the total expected percentage. 
* p < .05. * * p < .01. *** p <.001. 
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Table 4 
Percent of Children Attributing Discrete Emotions to Victimizers in Self and 
Hypothetical Conditions by Gain/No Gain 
Condition 
Self Hypothetical 
Emotions Gain No Gain Gain No Gain 
Happy 12.50 3.60 66.70** 27.60*** 
Angry 16.10 25.00 10.00* 27.60 
Sad 57.10 60.70 15.00 31.00 
Guilty 10.70 10.70 6.70 8.60 
Mixed 0.00 0.00 1.70 3.40 
Other Negative 3.57 0.00 0.00 1.70 
Note. Significant as compared to the total expected percentage. 
* p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 5 
Intensity of Emotions Attributed to Victims and Victimizers 
66 
Condition 
Self Hypothetical Effects 
Victim -2.830a -2.725a n.s. 
Victimizer -1.884b - .017c S > H * 
Note. On victim / victimizer differences: Means with different subscripts are 
significantly different from one another. 
*p < .0125. 
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Table 6 
Intensity of Emotions Attributed to Victims and Victimizers: Effect of Gain/NoGain 
Gain/No Gain 
Gain No Gain Effects 
Victim -2.79a -2.76a n.s. 
Victimizer - ,49b -1.34c G <NG** 
Note. On victim / victimizer differences: 
significantly different from one another. 
* p< .05. **p<. 01 
Means with different subscripts are 
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Table 7 
Percent of Children Giving Emotion Rationales to Victimizers in Self and Hypothetical 
Conditions 
Condition 
Rationales 
Moral 
Friendship Concerns 
Negative Outcome for Self 
Prior Conditions 
Outcome Reasons 
Joy of Victimization 
Self 
77.30*** 
2.70 
.90 
1.80 
15.50*** 
90*** 
Hypothetical 
34.80*** 
1.50*** 
1.50 
4.50 
44.00** 
6.80 
Note. Significant as compared to the total expected percentage. 
** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Table 8 65 
Percent of Children Giving Emotion Rationales to Victims and Victimizers in Self and Hypothetical Conditions by Gain/No Gain 
Self Hypothetical 
Rationales Victim Victimizer Victim Victimizer 
Gain No Gain Gain No Gain Gain No Gain Gain No Gain 
Moral 69.60* 98.20*** 75.51 79.69 76.67 90.00 23.40 40.00 
Friendship Concerns 0.00 0.00 2.04 3.13 0.00 0.50 1.60 3.10 
Negative Outcome for Self 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.56 0.00 0.00 3.10 0.00 
Prior Conditions 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.13 1.67 1.67 1.60* 9.20 
Outcome Reasons 30.40* 1.79*** 22.45 9.38 21.67 3.33 64.10** 26.20*= 
Joy of Victimization 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.56 0.00 0.00 3.00 10.80 
Note. Significant as compared to the total expected percentage 
* p < .05. ** p < . 0 1 *** p < .001. 
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Table 9 
Percent of Children Attributing Rationales to Victimizers in Self and Hypothetical 
Conditions by Grade 
Condition 
Self Hypothetical 
Rationales K-2nd 3rd_5th 6th-7 th K-2nd 3rd_5th 6th-7th 
Moral 83.90 68.90 93.50 39.30 27.30 38.90 
Friendship 0.00 4.20 3.20 0.00 5.50 0.00 
Prior Cond. 6.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.30 8.30 
Outcome 9.70 25.00 3.20 42.90 50.90 50.00 
Fear of Auth. 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.60 1.80 0.00 
Joy of Vic. 0.00 2.10 0.00 14.30 7.30 2.80 
Note. No significant effects were noted. 
